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Near-field Communication Technology:
Regulatory and Legal Recommendations for
Embracing the NFC Revolution
Allan Richarz*
INTRODUCTION
As a new workweek breaks over Tokyo, a young salaryman begins his trek to
work. Cycling to the nearest train station, he leaves his bicycle in an automated
bike lockup. Passing through the station ticket gate and into the crush of morning
rush hour, the salaryman stops at a kiosk to pick up the morning paper, followed by
bottle of water from a nearby vending machine. Arriving at his destination, he realizes he forgot to pick up omiyage, a traditional gift among Japanese co-workers,
and stops at a bakery adjacent to his station before completing his commute to
work.

While just another day to a Japanese salaryman, this story is interesting in that
over the course of his journey, the salaryman’s wallet never once left his pocket.
Rather, his payments were completed entirely by mobile phone; enabled by Nearfield Communication (NFC) technology. Six kilometres, five transactions, and no
wallet; this is the essence of osaifu keitai; digital e-wallets allowing instantaneous
and convenient payments at the tap of a phone or other NFC-enabled device.1

*

1

The author would like to thank Midori Otsu for her invaluable research assistance with
this article. This article is the winning entry in the 2013 IT.Can Student Writing
Contest.
Shiro Uesugi, “Consideration about successful introduction of smartcards: A comparative case study of Integrated Chip card business in Shikoku” (June 2007) 2:2 J of Entrepreneurship Research 96.
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While well-established in Japan,2 NFC, and the e-wallet mobile phone technology
it enables, remains in its infancy in Canada.3 It is, however, a technology that will
one day be widespread in Canada, but one that also raises important privacy considerations, as well as regulatory and technical questions outside the ambit of this
article, both in regard to the technology itself, and with the systems under which it
operates.
Despite its ease and convenience, NFC technology raises a number of privacy
issues. Chief among these concerns are the collection, retention, and usage of personally-identifying information contained within NFC-enabled devices by both private and public entities. Within that category, the most pressing privacy issues inherent in the collection and usage of such information relate to real-time tracking or
after-the-fact habit profiling and identity theft. As well, privacy issues persist
around the means used, if any, to secure and protect that information from unauthorized third parties both at the end-user and systemic database levels.
In light of these concerns, it is useful to examine the Japanese approach to
NFC technology, both dealing with the physical technology itself, and the system
of networks and databases in which that technology operates. Japan provides a
strong model for comparison given the country’s long-standing use of NFC technology,4 and robust privacy-protection laws and industry guidelines which exist in
relation to NFC usage. While privacy protection legislation exists in Canada, compliance is lacking and enforcement powers virtually non-existent for privacy commissioners. Amending Canada’s privacy legislation by taking cues from the Japanese model will allow Canada to better anticipate, and embrace, the “e-wallet
revolution”.5
In that regard, Canada must update its privacy and criminal legislation, and
provide clear industry guidelines in order to pre-emptively deal with expanded future uses of NFC technology. Such updates would include granting expanded powers to Canada’s Privacy Commissioner to impose fines and orders on businesses
found violating Canada’s federal privacy legislation, the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [PIPEDA]. Hand-in-hand with expanded
powers for the Commissioner would come binding regulations from the government for the NFC industry and stakeholders relating to data security and privacy
standards, and updates to the Criminal Code specifically addressing electronic/smart-money payment cards through the addition of technology-neutral language. These changes, made before widespread adoption of NFC technology in the
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Donald Amoroso & Remy Magnier-Watanabe, “Building a research model for mobile
wallet consumer adoption: the case of Mobile Suica in Japan” (April 2012) 7:1 J of
Theoretical & Applied Electronic Commerce Research 95 [Amoroso].
“Bankers group pitches cell phones as digital wallets” CBC News (14 May 2012), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2012/05/14/mobile-bankingcellphone.html> [Cell phones as digital wallets].
NFC adoption began in earnest in Japan in 2002 with the introduction of the Suica
transit payment system. See: “JR East launches its Suica system in Tokyo” (January
2002) 42:1 Int’l Railway J and Rapid Transit Review 18 [Suica System Launched].
Sam Gustin, “Paypal Pokes into POS ‘e-wallet’ market” Wired (30 April 2011) Online:
Wired <http://www.wired.com/business/2011/04/figcard/>.
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country, will allow Canada to proactively and effectively address concerns surrounding the technology and eliminate any “grey areas” in the law.

I. A BACKGROUND TO NEAR-FIELD COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY
(a) From RFID to NFC
Conforming to ISO 18092:2013,6 Near-field Communication technology
forms a subset of Radio-frequency Identification (RFID). Therefore, it is important
to examine the functions of RFID in order to understand the operation of NFC
technology.
RFID itself is a technology dating back to the Second World War, where it
found use in Allied fighter planes as an early form of “Identify Friend-Foe” detection system.7 In modern times, RFID technology is used across industries and society, primarily in relation to the tagging and tracking of livestock and inventory.8
RFID, as critics of the technology are quick to point out, can also allow for tracking
individual citizens.9 As well, modern RFID continues to shrink in size; Hitachi’s
“mu-chip”, for instance, is smaller than a grain of salt, earning it the nickname
“smart dust”.10
The technology behind RFID is relatively straightforward: a “tag” contains an
antenna and microchip containing small amounts of identifying information. An
external interrogator, or “reader”, uses radio waves to pick up the tag’s signal and
retrieve the information contained within.11 Of note is the distinction between “active” RFID tags and “passive”. The former contains, in addition to its microchip
and antenna, an onboard battery power supply, allowing for the active broadcast of
its signal up to several hundred metres away. Passive tags, by contrast, rely on the
external reader’s radio signal to power the tag’s antenna and microchip, necessitat-
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See: International Standards Organization, ISO/IEC 18092:2013 Information technology,
online:
International
Standards
Organization
<http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=
56692>. [ISO]
Office of Consumer Affairs, “Consumer Trends Report, RFID technologies and consumers in the retail marketplace” (Spring 2007), online: Industry Canada
<http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02287.html>
[Consumer
Trends
Report].
Ibid. at 3.
Kashmir Hill, “Court Rejecting Texas Student’s Opposition To RFID Tracker Not As
Outrageous As It Seems” Forbes (9 January 2013), online: Forbes
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/01/09/court-rejecting-texas-studentsopposition-to-rfid-tracker-not-as-outrageous-as-it-seems/> [Kashmir].
See:
“RFID
mu-Chip
Products”,
online:
Hitachi
<http://www.hitachi.ca/Apps/hitachicanada/content.jsp?page=forbus/security/muchip/index.html&path=jsp/hcl/hcl/en/>.
Timo Kasper et al, “An embedded system for practical security analysis of contactless
smart-cards”, in D Savveron et al, eds, The Proceedings of Workshop in Information
Security Theory and Practices, (New York: Springer, 2007), 151 [Kasper et al].
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ing a much shorter read range.12 NFC fits into this equation by having an intentionally short read range of 10cm or less away from a tag reader, and in many cases,
requiring a read-range of 4cm or less.13 It is important to note that while NFC can
be considered short-range RFID, not all short-range RFID is necessarily NFC, as
“short-range” RFID can still have a theoretical read range of 50cm or greater.14

(b) Applications of NFC Technology
Given the technology’s short read-range, NFC is often incorporated into contactless platforms, such as access control badges or commuter passes. Examples of
the latter include London’s Oyster Card15, Hong Kong’s Octopus Card,16 the
Presto Pass17 in Southern Ontario, and Tokyo’s Suica Card.18 NFC also forms the
basis for e-wallet technology, which transforms commuter passes and mobile
phones into contactless payment platforms across a number of different consumer
contexts.19
As noted above, NFC technology is widespread in Japan, which makes the
Japanese approach to the technology helpful in determining Canadian best practices. Driving the ubiquity of this technology is the “Super Urban Intelligent Card”,
or Suica, commuter pass and e-wallet.20 Examining this particular card is useful in
understanding the range of possibilities presented by e-wallet technology. Started in
2002 by the JR East Group rail company, Suica began as a contactless commuter
pass designed to replace Tokyo’s traditional, and expensive, paper-and-magnetic
ticketing system.21 Gradually, as engineers refined NFC technology further, Suica
cards were embedded with electronic cash (e-cash) capabilities which allowed the

12

13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, RFID in the Workplace: Recommendations for good practices (March 2008) 28, online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of
Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/researchrecherche/consultations/2008/rfid_e.asp>.
Michael David & Kouichi Sakurai, “Security issues for Contactless Smart cards” in
Hideki Imai & Yuliang Zheng, eds, Public Key Cryptography (New York: Springer,
1998) 248 [Michael David]. See also: Kasper et al, supra note 11 at 158.
Yan Zhang & Paris Kitsos, eds, Security in RFID and Sensor Networks, (New York:
CRC Press, 2009) at 157.
See Transport for London, “Oyster Online”, online: Transport for London
<https://oyster.tfl.gov.uk/oyster/entry.do>.
See Octopus, “Welcome to Octopus”, online: Octopus Holdings Ltd
<http://www.octopus.com.hk/home/en/index.html>.
See
MetroLinx,
“Welcome
to
Presto”,
online:
MetroLinx
<https://www.prestocard.ca/en/>.
See JR East Railway Company, “Suica”, online: JR East Railway Company
<http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/pass/suica.html>.
See
Sony,
“FeliCa”,
online:
Sony
<http://www.sony.net/pressroom/sonytec/FeliCa.html>.
JR East Management Planning Department, “20 years of JR East” (March 2008) 49
Japan Railway and Transport Review 21 [20 years of JR East].
Koichi Goto, “Passenger Service Technologies” (July 2000) 24 Japan Railway and
Transport Review 51-2.
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cards to be used as a micro-payment method at convenience stores, station kiosks,
restaurants, vending machines, and department stores.22 Several models of laptops
in Japan are also equipped with an on-board Suica reader, allowing for the use of
Suica cards in online purchases.23 Further developments in the NFC field led to the
above-mentioned osaifu keitai; NFC-enabled mobile phone e-wallets, which act as
a digital Suica card.
While Suica cards utilize the same “tap and go” technique as payment methods found in Canada, such as Visa’s Pay-wave,24 these cards are distinct from
credit and debit cards in that they are “stored-value” cards; that is, value is contained in the card itself, rather than linked through a bank or credit account.25 Metrolinx’s new Presto Card is similar to Suica in that it is also a stored-value card;
however, Presto Cards can only be used, at present, in a commuting context without the broader shopping capabilities of Suica.26 As the example of Japan shows,
NFC technology is capable of allowing new digital forms of payment by transforming ordinary commuter passes and mobile phones into multi-purpose payment
platforms.

II. PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF NFC TECHNOLOGY
NFC technology and e-wallets present a number of exciting technical innovations. Card read-times are less than one-hundred milliseconds and require no PIN
input,27 allowing for quick and easy transactions, as well as providing the convenience of a cashless micro-payment experience. The technology, however, does
raise a number of important issues in relation to privacy as discussed below, which
must be addressed in order to allow for the smooth and widespread adoption of
NFC technology in Canada.

(a) Real-time Tracking: Fact or fiction?
Before analyzing realistic privacy concerns raised by NFC technology, it is
necessary to first dispense with perhaps the strongest criticism of broader RFID
technology as a whole: the spectre of real-time tracking of citizens through RFID

22
23

24

25
26
27

20 years of JR East, supra note 20 at 21.
See: The LaVie Z NFC-enabled laptop: Seamus Byrne, “Why you can’t have the
world’s lightest ultra-book” CNET (7 September 2012) online: CNET
<http://www.cnet.com.au/why-you-cant-have-the-worlds-lightest-ultrabook339341473.htm>.
CBC News, “New credit cards pose security problem” CBC News (2 June 2010), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2010/05/31/f-rfid-credit-cards-security-concerns.html>.
Amoroso, supra note 2 at 95.
Presto,
“About
Presto”,
online:
Presto
<https://prestocard.ca/enUS/Pages/ContentPages/About.aspx>.
Michael David, supra note 13 at 247.
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by the state.28 As a subset of RFID, NFC technology is not immune from this criticism. Critics such as former US Congressman Bob Barr allege that an individual
carrying, or in more conspiratorial examples, surreptitiously implanted/affixed
with, an RFID tag can be covertly tracked, in real-time, by government actors.29
Numerous analogous contexts exist for this theory: RFID tracking of school children,30 amusement park patrons,31 and resort guests32 are all realities. Without
wading into the debate relative to RFID as a whole, however, the idea of real-time
tracking of NFC devices is illusory.
It is important to recall the above discussion of active versus passive RFID
and the operable read-range of NFC devices. NFC devices are passive and require
power from the radio waves of an interrogator. Moreover, per their ISO standardization, NFC has a maximum read range of 10cm or less.33 A theoretical doubling
of that read range to 20cm would require that the power source to the interrogator
increase sixteen-fold,34 and the use of a “large copper tube antenna”.35 This
presents two theoretical options for real-time NFC tracking: that a surveillant remain no more than 10cm from a target, which itself would obviate the need for
electronic tracking, or that surveillance be conducted using massive, and conspicuous, interrogators, owing to the exponential power increases needed to read an NFC
device from even two metres away. As American intellectual property expert John
Eden notes, “critics of RFID technology often overlook or intentionally downplay
the fact that extremely Orwellian RFID systems would require an integrated network of readers in addition to the ubiquitous affixation of tags”.36 Practically
speaking, real-time tracking of NFC devices is not feasible and exists as a possibil-
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Bob Barr, “Far more eyes are watching” New York Times (7 August 2011) online: New
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/06/is-it-still-possibleto-disappear/far-more-eyes-are-now-watching-than-hunted-db-cooper>.
Ibid.
Kashmir, supra note 9.
Brooks Barnes, “At Disney Parks, a bracelet meant to build loyalty (and sales)” New
York
Times
(7
January
2013)
online:
New
York
Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/business/media/at-disney-parks-a-braceletmeant-to-build-loyalty-andsales.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1357609868eyqv65kWoRFF47O/45Xgfw>.
International Telecommunications Union, “Ubiquitous Network Societies: The Case of
RFID” (April 2005), online: International Telecommunications Union
<http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/ubiquitous/Papers/RFID%20background%20paper.pdf>.
ISO, supra note 6.
Akshay Utlama Nambi et al, “Near Field Communication — Applications and Performance Studies” in KR Venugopal & LM Patnaik, eds, Wireless Networks and Computational Intelligence, Volume 292 (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012) at 9.
Kasper et al, supra note 11 at 158.
John M Eden, “When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, the Privacy
Act of 1974, and the Future of RFID” (2005) 20 Duke L & Tech Rev at 1, online: Duke
Law
&
Technology
Journal
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0020.pdf>.
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ity only in theory. However, while real-time tracking may not be possible, there are
legitimate concerns over NFC devices being used in ways contrary to the privacy
interests of individuals.

(b) Profiling
NFC devices and e-wallets have long memories. Every purchase, train stop,
and card top-up are dutifully recorded by an individual’s NFC device.37 This raises
the very real possibility of companies building consumer profiles on its customers,
especially in the case of NFC devices registered under an owner’s name. This is, in
fact, a reality with the Suica card. At the card’s launch, JR East openly acknowledged that widespread acceptance of NFC payment by retailers was expected given
the wealth of information it would provide on customers’ traits and habits.38
The information provided to retailers can take many forms. An NFC device
might reveal a person’s favourite foods and stores, clothing preferences, alcohol
consumption, and most frequently-ridden bus and train routes. Use of so-called
“smart posters”, which contain an NFC chip to provide a user with information on
an advertised product, commonly movies, may also reveal film-watching habits,
interests or other tastes.39
In one regard, this information may be used in a relatively benign manner as a
means of market research. Stores, for example, could aggregate collected data to
better understand which products sell well in their stores and which do not, and
adjust inventories accordingly. This would be particularly useful to grocery stores
which have large amounts of perishable goods.40 A more intrusive use of collected
data, however, would involve targeted advertising. If an individual was known enjoy a certain type of candy bar, a retailer could strategically place NFC readers in
near the check-out counter to “push” advertisements for said candy bar or other
impulse items to his customer’s mobile phone. In-store digital television advertisements could similarly adjust to present advertisements aimed at customers currently
in a given store.

(c) Personal Safety
In addition to recording an individual’s shopping habits, NFC devices can be
used to examine where an individual has traveled. In that regard, by examining

37

38
39

40

Ann Cavoukian, “Privacy by Design . . . Take the Challenge” Information and Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario, at 169, online: Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario
<http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2010/03/PrivacybyDesignBook.pdf>
[Privacy by Design].
Suica System Launched, supra note 4 at 19.
Ann Cavoukian, “Mobile Near-Field Communications: ‘Tap ‘n Go’: Keep it Secure
and Private” Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario at 5, online: Information
and
Privacy
Commissioner
of
Ontario
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/mobile-nfc.pdf> [Tap n Go].
Shino Koda, “Towards Environmentally-friendly Management at “Konbini”: Case
study at a Convenience Store in Japan” (2012) 3:4 J of Alt Perspectives in the Social
Sciences 950.
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entrance and exit times at train stations or on bus routes, it is easy to determine a
person’s commuting habits, and consequently, where an individual may be at a
given time based on those habits. Determining the general location of an individual’s residence is also possible.
Media reports from Japan shed some light on practical applications of this
principle. While the Suica system has never experienced a leak of personal data,
there have been a number of cases involving the stalking of train passengers by
railway employees.41 By scanning a commuter’s card while in an official capacity,42 a station employee can examine the travel history and generally predict where
and when a commuter will get off the train at the end of her workday. A passenger’s Suica travel history can also be used in legal proceedings against a defendant.43 London’s Oyster card has a similar vulnerability. In one well-known example, a man’s wife was able to enter his Oyster card serial number online to
determine which stations he had visited. The husband was subsequently found to be
carrying on an illicit affair, and his Oyster card travel history was tendered as evidence in the subsequent divorce proceedings.44

(d) Protection and Loss of Personal Data
Ontario’s Privacy Commissioner, Dr. Ann Cavoukian, describes NFC as a
“promiscuous” technology; that is, it provides unencrypted data to any reader
within range, often without any authentication procedures.45 No special technological know-how is required to read such a device. The Google Play Store is rife, for
instance, with applications (“apps”) for NFC-enabled phones which allow them to
read the unencrypted data on NFC-enabled credit cards and commuter passes such
as Visa, Suica, and Oyster.46 While the “secure element” of a card requires more
advanced knowledge to access,47 an easily downloadable app can provide an individual with a credit card’s number, account holder name, and expiry date, or a
commuter’s name, phone number, and travel history — information which is not
stored within the secure core.48
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Yomiuri Shimbun, “Tokyo Metro staffer leaked Pasmo data” (17 April 2012) online:
Yomiuri Shimbun <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T120417004863.htm>.
Shinsuke Uriuhara, “Automatic fare collection system” (2003) 123:8 IEEJ Transactions
on Sensors and Micro-machines 25, online: Physics Abstract Service
<http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003IJTSM.123..271U>.
Decision of Nagahashi, Okabe, Iida JJ, Case No. 1446 (2006), First Saitama District
Court (Criminal), 11 June 2007 at para 4., online: Courts in Japan
<http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20071031170422.pdf> [translated by author].
Steve Bloomfield, “How an Oyster card could ruin your marriage” The Independent
(19
February
2006),
online:
The
Independent
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/how-an-oyster-card-could-ruinyour-marriage-467077.html>.
Privacy by Design, supra note 37 at 169.
Google Play Shop, online: <https://play.google.com/store/search?q=suica>.
Wayan Suparta, “Application of NFC Technology for mobile airline ticketing” (2012)
8:9 J of Comp Science 1237.
Google Play Shop, supra note 46.
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The voluminous quantity of personal information gathered by NFC devices is
enough to make a retailer or marketer salivate, and there may be a temptation to
commodify personal information for sale to telemarketers and other advertisers.
While not unique to NFC, the misuse or sale of personal information collected by
retailers is worrisome given the insidious and invisible nature of the data collection.49 Beyond the nature of the data collection, however, the traditional concerns
of identity theft and privacy invasion surrounding the selling of personal information still exist.

(e) Lack of the Basics: NFC and data security
The above issues can primarily be traced back to a lack of “Basic Access Controls”50 (BAC) over card data, such as encryption or password protection. This appears to be a common design problem with NFC technology and is not limited to
just commuter passes and credit cards. When Belgium introduced its new RFIDenabled e-passports in 2005, European researchers discovered that the e-passports
were completely lacking in even basic encryption; that is to say, the passports were
entirely unencrypted.51 Making matters worse, this first batch of passports had been
earmarked for distribution to military, diplomatic, and business elites, who consequently travelled with entirely unsecured passports.52 Regardless of the platform,
the ease with which personal information can be obtained through NFC devices is
generally indicative of poor design. While the “secure element” of a device remains
tamper-resistant, so-called “Track 2” data is inadequately secured, leaving individuals vulnerable to data and identity theft, and creating significant privacy
concerns.53

III. LEGAL AND REGULATORY APPROACHES TO NFC
TECHNOLOGY
The above privacy concerns represent significant, but not fatal, issues in the
adoption of NFC e-wallet technology. These issues exist at both the end-user stage,
and on a systemic level; that is to say, there are challenges with both the physical
NFC devices themselves, and issues with the infrastructure under which those devices exist. As will be discussed below, these concerns can be dealt with at both the
legislative and regulatory level. Before analyzing potential solutions to the privacy
challenges raised by NFC technology, however, it is necessary to examine the legislative privacy frameworks under which NFC operates in both Canada and Japan.

49
50

51
52
53

Tap n Go, supra note 39 at 6.
Gildas Avoine et al “ePassport: Securing international Contacts with Contactless
Chips” in Gene Tsudik, ed, Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Volume 5143
(Brussels: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008) at 145 [ePassport].
Ibid. at 150.
Ibid.
Thomas S Heydt-Benjamin et al, “Vulnerabilities in First-generation RFID-enabled
Credit Cards” New York Times at 3, online: New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/20061023_CARD/fc2007-submission.pdf> [Heydt-Benjamin].
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(a) Japan
(i) Act on the Protection of Personal Information
Passed in 2003 and taking effect in 2005, Japan’s Act on the Protection of
Personal Information [APPI] is that country’s leading legal document relating to
individuals’ privacy rights.54 The Act lays out important responsibilities for both
private and state bodies pertaining to the handling of personal information.55
Two important provisions within the APPI relating to private corporations
handling personal information are Articles 15 and 16. These articles state that a
corporation must declare its purpose in handling personal data through a public
“purpose of utilization” document, and that any handling of personal information
cannot deviate from that document.56 Further, Article 24 of the APPI states that the
following information must be made immediately available to consumers:
•
The name of the business operator handling personal information,
•
The Purpose of Utilization,
•
Procedures to meet various disclosure requirements specified elsewhere
in the Act; and,
•
Any additional notice requirements as set out by Cabinet Order57
Informed consent among consumers is the chief factor at play. The Act later
specifies that the purposes of utilization be publicly posted, or that consumers be
notified promptly by other means (in order for the collection of personal data to be
lawful). And in any event, the collection of personal data cannot be through “deception or . . . wrongful means”.58
The Act also deals with personal information on a broader systemic level. Business operators are required to take any necessary steps towards the “prevention of
leakage, loss or damage” of personal data, as well as any other “security control”
methods necessary to ensure the protection of personal data held by the operator.59
Concomitant with the above system-level control of personal data, business operators are further obliged to exercise “necessary and appropriate” control over employees with access to personal data to ensure security control of the data and to
prevent misuse.60 Business operators are also expressly forbidden from passing
along consumers’ personal information to third parties without the prior consent of
the consumers in question.61
The importance of these provisions rests in affixing clear responsibility to the
management and ownership of businesses to ensure personal information within its
control is not misused at either a corporate or individual level, and mandating pro54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Act on the Protection of Personal information, Act No 119 of 2003, online:
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf> [APPI].
Ibid. at arts 4-5, 7.
Ibid. at art 16.
Ibid. at art 24.
Ibid. at art 17.
Ibid. at art 20.
Ibid. at art 21.
Ibid. at art 23.
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tections be put in place to maintain the security of its personal information
databases. Preventing disclosure of personal data to third parties in Article 23 of the
APPI is also important as, in the past, Japanese businesses were apt to view personal information databases as commodities to be freely bought and sold.62
One noticeable difference between Canadian and Japanese privacy legislation
is the public body responsible for overseeing, and enforcing, compliance with the
Acts. In contrast to Canada, Japan does not have Privacy Commissioners; rather,
the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Act is delegated to a “competent
Minister”. In the context of privacy legislation, the competent ministers are the
Minister of Health, [Labour] and Welfare, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, and any other minister so delegated by the Prime
Minister.63
Enforcement of privacy legislation in Japan also differs from Canada, as, in
contrast to the Privacy Commissioners in Canada who can only issue non-binding
reports and recommendations,64 the competent Ministers are empowered with escalating enforcement powers of advice, recommendations, orders and, ultimately, regulatory sanctions.65
Enforcement of the Act takes a graduated approach. Ministers are permitted to
provide general pre-emptory “advice” to business operators relating to compliance
with the Act, while Article 34(1) of the APPI states violations of the Act may result
first in a ministerial “recommendation” that violations cease, and that certain measures be implemented to ensure future compliance with the Act. If the above recommendation goes unheeded, the competent Minister may order compliance with the
Act and with any previously-recommended measures.66 Where a violation is particularly serious, flagrant, or otherwise causes “serious infringement of the rights and
interests of individuals”, the competent Minister may bypass the recommendation
stage and order immediate compliance with the Act, as well as ordering a business
operator to take any other steps necessary to correct the violation.67
Competent ministers are also empowered to compel business operators to provide reports to the relevant minister detailing the operator’s handling of personal
information. Where business owners refuse to provide reports, or refuse to accede
to ministerial orders relating to compliance with the Act, the operator is liable for a
term of imprisonment with work, or to a fine.68
Japan’s privacy legislation also provides for a non-judicial complaint resolution process, wherein an individual wishing to make a complaint may first seek
redress from an “authorized personal information protection organization” tasked
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with handling such disputes.69 Such organizations are authorized, upon receipt of a
complaint, to investigate a business operator and request a response from a targeted
business. Absent justifiable reason, such requests for response cannot be rejected
by a business.70
The above oversight and sanctioning provisions of Japan’s privacy legislation
are both key to ensuring compliance with the Act. The legislation is not heavyhanded in its treatment of business operators that violate the Act, however. The Act
is geared towards the smooth and expeditious resolution of disputes and in providing a graduated enforcement regime by granting ministers discretion in how to encourage a business operator to comply with the Act. This is in line with promoting
the Japanese government’s “ubiquitous society” agenda of widespread technological adoption throughout the country.71 At the same time, provisions exist which
give “teeth” to the legislation, and allow for the government to force compliance
with privacy regulations, and impose further penal sanctions for violations of ministerial directives.

(ii) Joint governmental guidelines on the applicability of the APPI
Japan’s privacy legislation is not the only means through which the government attempts to protect individuals’ privacy and personal information. Industry
and technology-specific guidelines are also published to provide additional guidance in terms of privacy and data protection. Relating to NFC technology, the
Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications [MIAC], and Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry [METI] published its joint “Guidelines for Privacy Protection with Regard to RFID tags”.72 These guidelines provide valuable
clarification regarding NFC technology, and RFID as a whole, as it relates to Japanese privacy legislation. In that regard, the guidelines are explicit that “the use [of
NFC technology] shall be regulated by the Law for the Protection of Personal Information”.73 Further, Article 3 of the guidelines state that, prior to a transaction
with a consumer, NFC/RFID-tagged products and devices be identified as such by
retailers, and that information be posted regarding the types of data to be contained
or collected within those devices and products.74 These guidelines have the force of
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law, and are part of the broader “Guidelines for Personal Information Protection
Laws Concerning Fields of Economy and Industry” regulatory scheme undertaken
by METI in providing guidance to industry.75

(iii) Penal Code
The Japanese Penal Code also weighs in on the issue of NFC technology in
relation to e-wallets, specifying a penalty of 10 years in jail or a fine of up to 1
million yen for the unauthorized use, possession, creation, or other misadministration of an electronic payment card.76 The unauthorized collection or “spoofing” of
information contained within an electronic payment device, or attempts to do so,
also attract a penal sanction of three years in jail or a fine of 500,000 yen.77 Also of
note is the broad definition of “electromagnetic record” in the context of payment
cards. Rather than focus on the physical medium in which the data resides, the
Japanese Penal Code takes a technology-neutral approach, defining such payment
cards as any payment medium containing data which is: a) “unrecognizable by natural perceptive functions”; and b) capable of being read by a computer system.78

(iv) Summary of the Japanese approach
The approach of Japan to privacy legislation is both comprehensive and effective. Privacy legislation provides for basic protections of individuals’ personal information, and allows for a graduated enforcement mechanism up to and including
penal sanctions. Privacy legislation is augmented by periodic ministerial guidelines
relating to new advances in technology. In the context of NFC technology, privacy
legislation and guidelines are bolstered by stiff criminal sanctions imposed by Japan’s Penal Code.
One may note the irony of Japan having such a robust privacy and personal
information protection regime, given that the Japanese language lacks a native
word for “privacy”, and that traditional Western concepts of privacy generally remain antithetical to the Japanese collective culture.79 It is true that Japanese privacy
legislation is not driven purely by altruistic concern for the protection of individuals’ personal data; rather, business efficacy plays no small part in Japan’s embrace
of a robust privacy regime. As noted in the pre-amble to Japan’s APPI, the purpose
of the legislation is the protection of rights of individuals “while taking consideration of the usefulness of personal information . . . in an advanced information and
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communications society”.80 Elements of this business efficacy approach are also
evident in the above-mentioned ministerial NFC/RFID guidelines, which contain
provisions encouraging businesses to engage in public awareness campaigns touting the benefits of RFID technology to consumers.81 As mentioned above, this accords with the emphasis of the Japanese government on remaining a technological
innovator, and adopter, which ultimately entails the aggressive promotion of technology throughout society.82
Regardless of the motivations behind their privacy protection regime, however, Japan’s comprehensive and multi-faceted approach to privacy and data protection provides invaluable guidance for improving and readying Canada’s privacy
protection regime for the future widespread adoption of NFC technology. One
notes that in over ten years of operation, Japan’s most ubiquitous NFC technology,
Suica and Suica-enabled mobile phones, have not suffered a single major breach of
customers’ personal data; it is an achievement due in no small part to the clearlydefined system of rules under which the technology operates.83

(b) Canada
(i) Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
Operative across the country,84 Canada’s main privacy legislation is the Personal information Protection and Electronic Documents Act [PIPEDA]. Applying
to, among others, every organization that deals with personal information in a commercial context,85 PIPEDA seeks to “govern the collection, use and disclosure of
personal information in a manner that recognizes the right of privacy of individuals
with respect to their personal information” and the legitimate needs of organizations to make use of this information in the course of business.86
As noted above, a main point of divergence between PIPEDA and Japanese
privacy legislation relates to the government body in charge of enforcing the legislation and the enforcement powers available to those bodies. While enforcement
responsibility in Japan rests with a number of cabinet ministers, Canada, at the
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federal level, takes an “ombudsman” approach,87 wherein investigative duties
under PIPEDA are vested first in the Privacy Commissioner, with the possibility of
secondary recourse to the Federal Court.
Canada’s Privacy Commissioner is empowered to receive and initiate complaints relating to breaches in the handling of personal information, and conduct
investigations using a broad range of powers including the ability to compel witnesses and evidence, as well as a right-of-access to any place apart from residences.88 Upon completion of the investigation, the Commissioner then tenders reports to the complainant and respondent organization detailing the investigation’s
results, along with any recommendations the Commissioner sees appropriate. As
Ryerson University’s Avner Levin notes however, the Privacy Commissioner does
not “have a lot of teeth” as the office is not currently endowed with enforcement
powers.89
One will note that recommendations tendered by the Privacy Commissioner
are non-binding. In contrast with the competent Ministers of Japan, and indeed of
other jurisdictions,90 the federal Privacy Commissioner has no power to compel
offending organizations to take corrective measures, nor does the Commissioner
have the power to impose sanctions on those organizations. Unsatisfied complainants, upon receipt of the Commissioner’s report, must instead seek redress from the
Federal Court, per section 14(1) of PIPEDA. It is there that they may seek orders
for compliance or compensation. The Privacy Commissioner herself may also,
upon completion of her report, make an application to the Federal Court.91 In that
regard, Canada at the federal level lacks a “one-stop shop” for seeking redress in
situations involving privacy breaches. This two-step approach has attracted criticism from the BC Civil Liberties Association [BCCLA], which notes the low-cost
benefit of an ombudsman approach is obviated by the high cost of taking a case to
the Federal Court.92 The BCCLA report further notes that respondents are “free to
ignore recommendations [of the Privacy Commissioner]” with the only consequences being additional complaints.93 While the Privacy Commissioner has had
notable successes,94 a common complaint remains the lack of enforcement powers
held by the Commissioner.
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(ii) Behind the times: A lack of binding governmental guidelines for NFC
Technology
Looking towards technology-specific regulations on NFC, Canada lags in
terms of binding guidelines for the NFC industry in the implementation and usage
of the technology. While Industry Canada has conducted background research on
the technology,95 it has yet to proffer binding industry regulations similar to those
issued in Japan in regard to NFC. Such guidelines would not be unprecedented in
Canada; the Competition Bureau of Industry Canada has previously published
guidelines relating to e-commerce.96
It is not to suggest that there is no guidance from the government in regard to
NFC; rather, that such guidance is only advisory in nature. Ontario’s Information
and Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian, has published a number of reports
dealing with Near-field Communication and best-practices proposals for the technology. These proposals, which are only advisory in nature owing to the IPC’s lack
of jurisdiction over businesses in a non-health information context, exhort businesses to adhere to “Privacy by Design” principles in order to strike the best balance between consumers’ data protection and business efficacy.97 An addendum to
the Canadian Government’s Code of Conduct for the Credit and Debit Card Industry in Canada has also been proposed, which would cover mobile payments, although its coverage would be limited to “payments initiated by consumers that access a deposit or credit account through a debit or credit payment network through
a mobile device at the point-of-sale” [emphasis added], thus excluding NFC mobile
payments.98
The private sector has also weighed in on the issue in a non-binding fashion.
There exists a voluntary best-practices guide created by the Canadian banking industry in 2012 as it relates to NFC technology.99 This best-practices initiative is
designed to pro-actively foster a “convenient, open, safe and secure [NFC] ecosystem supported by a standards-based operating framework” and covers the broad
range of stakeholders in future NFC development.100 While both this voluntary
code of ethics and the Ontario IPC’s guidelines provide useful guidance to busi-
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nesses dealing with NFC, the inherent weakness in both is their non-binding nature.
Like Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, Ontario’s IPC lacks the power under the
province’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to compel businesses to adopt best-practice proposals.101 Further, while the banking industry’s
best-practices guidelines are thoroughly presented, they ultimately remain nonbinding on stakeholders.

(iii) Canada’s Criminal Code: Not meeting the reality of NFC micropayments
A further weakness of the current Canadian approach to NFC technology is
the Criminal Code’s lack of applicability, as compared to the Japanese Penal Code
in relation to crimes dealing with NFC technology. While the Criminal Code contains provisions specifically on the topic of credit card fraud, those provisions are
inapplicable to NFC-enabled smart cards. The Criminal Code defines a credit card
at Section 321(a)-(b) as:
Any card . . . or other device issued or otherwise distributed for the purpose
of being used
a) On presentation to obtain, on credit, money, goods, services or
any other thing of value, or
b) In an automated teller machine . . . or a similar automated
banking device to obtain any of the services offered through the
machine . . . [emphasis added]102

Under the above definition, NFC-enabled smart-cards would be excluded by
virtue of the fact that payments made through that medium are not “on credit”,
given that smart-cards carry their value on-board. Further, lacking a magnetic strip
or “chip-and-pin” technology, NFC-enabled smart-cards are not interoperable with
ATMs and similar banking machines. While the Criminal Code does not explicitly
address the issue of NFC smart-cards, it is arguable that the fraudulent misuse of
such cards may be caught by general Criminal Code provisions relating to electronic mischief and identity theft.103 Without clear application to NFC payment
devices, as found in the Japanese Penal Code, there is uncertainty about which, if
any, provisions of the Criminal Code may definitively apply to crimes surrounding
NFC devices. The provisions addressing electronic mischief, for instance, deal with
attacks against, and interference with, computer data and consequently are of questionable applicability to NFC “spoofing” or cloning. Further grey areas exist in the
above-mentioned government credit and debit card Code of Conduct, which appears to exclude stored-value payment cards much the same way the Criminal
Code does.
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(iv) Summary of the Canadian approach
Canada’s privacy protection laws and Criminal Code are not necessarily weak
in general. In the face of potential widespread adoption of a new and ubiquitous
technology, however, Canada risks “leading from behind” in regulating privacy and
criminal activity surrounding NFC technology through outdated and/or ineffective
regulatory and legislative schemes. Uncertainty and grey areas in the law undermine business efficacy, but also have broader societal impacts. It would be unfortunate for a massive data breach of an NFC database, or a criminal fraudster duplicating hundreds of NFC smart cards, to go unpunished due to uncertainty in the law.

IV.

APPROACHES
FOR
MEETING
REVOLUTION IN CANADA

THE

E-WALLET

To address the above shortcomings in Canadian law relating to NFC technology, there are a number of proposals which will better position Canada to deal with
the technology pro-actively and effectively. While a number of these proposals fall
into the broader debate surrounding Canadian privacy law in general, they nonetheless also find particular relevance to NFC technology.

(a) A Technology-neutral Criminal Code amendment
In addition to binding industry regulations discussed below, amending the
Criminal Code is another means by which Canada can prepare for the widespread
adoption of NFC. An amendment to Canada’s Criminal Code would pave the way
for wider adoption and usage of NFC-technology by making clear the illegality of
tampering with, copying, or otherwise causing the maladministration of an NFCenabled device. Potential amendments include changing the wording of Section 321
of the Criminal Code to include a broader range of payment cards, rather than just
credit cards. Such changes were made to the Japanese Penal Code, the provisions
of which apply not just to credit cards, but “other cards [used] for the payment of
charges”, including electronically-encoded payment cards and stored-value media.104 Such an amendment is also supported in Canada by the Canadian Bankers
Association, which has published a white paper stating that the Criminal Code does
“not capture all of the present or future payment methods that may be threatened by
criminal activity” and that flexible, technology-neutral language is required.105 As
noted above, while it is arguable that the provisions of the Criminal Code dealing
with fraud and identity theft may be sufficient to cover NFC-devices, adopting
broader language to cover non-traditional payment media will remove uncertainty
from the law. At the very least, by updating the language of Section 321 of the
Criminal Code to include non-credit payment cards, the criminal law will move
towards technology-neutral language to cover NFC smart-cards and future nextgeneration cards.
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The argument can be made that the Criminal Code need not pre-empt, nor
react to, potential flash-in-the-pan technologies that are discarded just as quickly as
they are adopted. To that end, there are no guarantees that NFC will become widespread in Canada and may very well enter obsolescence shortly after emerging in
the Canadian market. While a valid concern, NFC’s performance in Europe and
Asia shows it has sufficient cachet to be considered a viable technology in North
America, particularly as it is a technological system, rather than a single product
which consumers may or may not support.106 Further, there is the general principle
of drafting technology-neutral laws so that legislatures need not continually play
“catch up” with technological innovations. In that regard, by updating language in
the Criminal Code relating to credit card fraud, the law will cover any number of
future media-based payment methods and not just those made by NFC smart-cards.

(b) Binding Guidelines on Data-protection and Security Measures
Binding regulations issued by Industry Canada for the NFC sector are one
such way the Canadian government can make current its policies towards Nearfield Communication. As noted above, Industry Canada, through the Competition
Bureau, has exercised this power previously in relation to application of the Competition Act to cross-border online commerce.107 By providing clear rules to NFC
stakeholders, Industry Canada can forestall any grey areas in the law concerning
the applicability of PIPEDA or the Criminal Code to the technology, while also
offering pre-emptory guidance on best-practices for securing customers’ personal
information.
On a technical level, Industry Canada guidelines would be beneficial in establishing basic security benchmarks for NFC technology both systemically and on an
end-user basis. As Dr. Cavoukian notes with some frustration, many of even the
largest and most sophisticated databases containing personally-indentifying information lack basic safeguards.108 NFC devices themselves also remain vulnerable.
While transactional functions of a smart card, for instance, are stored within the
“Secure Element” of the card, information such as the card’s serial number, travel
history, and other personally-identifying information remain in unsecured plain text
form, as noted above.
Potential industry security mandates on the end-user level could include basic
encryption for NFC-enabled devices such as smart-cards and mobile phones that
protects the totality of the information contained within, and not merely the “Secure
Element”. On a design level, NFC-enabled mobile phone apps should be programmed to only broadcast signals upon specific request of the owner, rather than being
in an “always on” state.109 Mandatory issuance, promotion, or integration of inex-
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pensive quick-access “Faraday Cages”, which block RFID/NFC signals, is another
possibility and current practice in U.S. e-passport issuance.110 In Privacy by Design
parlance, the preference should be for solutions that are “baked in” at the design
level, rather than “bolted on” afterwards.111 There is strength, however, in baked-in
measures supplemented by bolted-on security features — for instance, a secure
smart-card carried inside an after-market Faraday Cage.
On a systemic level, applicable beyond NFC-specific technology, basic encryption and passwords for databases must be mandated by industry-specific guidelines. While such measures will not deter a concerted attack by professional hackers, such basic steps will at least deter casual or opportunistic attacks against
databases. System-side security measures cannot ignore the human factor, however.
As Dr. Cavoukian reports, 70% of data breaches are attributable to insiders.112 A
significant number of data breaches can also be attributed to poor, or non-existent,
database-handling procedures. Dr. Cavoukian further notes example after example
of laptops, hard-drives, and other media containing the personal data of millions of
individuals carelessly left on street corners, public transportation, and other similar
locations.113 To prevent, or lessen the occurrence of, these institutional data
breaches, proper auditing, access-control, and chain-of-custody procedures need to
be mandated and enforced.
Dealing with the technological ecosystem as a whole, any guideline issued by
the Canadian government should also take a page from the joint guidelines of the
Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and note explicitly the application of PIPEDA to NFC
technology where personally-identifying information is collected, or where the
technology’s usage allows for inferences as to a person’s identity. By issuing such
guidelines, Industry Canada can make clear from the start that data collected
through NFC devices deserves the same protections and respect as personally-identifying information collected from more traditional means such as loyalty cards or
in-store surveys.
While emphasizing the applicability of PIPEDA to NFC technology, Industry
Canada must also work with stakeholders to increase public awareness of the technology to spur on its wider adoption. As the METI Guidelines state, it is incumbent
upon both industry stakeholders, and the government, to undertake public awareness campaigns to educate consumers on the nature and benefits of new technology. Such a guideline would find particular relevance in Canada, where the failure
of Ontario’s public sector smart-card system launch, and indeed, the entire project,
was attributable, in part, to the failure of both industry and government to properly
inform the public of the nature of the proposed smart-card system.114
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By mandating the above proposals, the government can anticipate, and preempt, the identified weaknesses in NFC technology; namely, uncertainty as to its
relationship with PIPEDA and general shortcomings in terms of properly securing
personally-identifying information. This is preferable to a reactive wait-and-see approach, which would only act after a large, but preventable, data breach. As well,
by acting early the government can foster a “culture of privacy”115 among NFC
stakeholders from the beginning, which ultimately benefits consumers.

(c) Power (and Teeth) to the Federal Privacy Commissioner
The issue of Canada’s Privacy Commissioner must also be addressed. While
not dealing with NFC-technology specifically, but rather with the broader privacy
ecosystem in which it operates, a final recommendation would involve expanding
the powers of Canada’s Privacy Commissioner to include the ability to issue fines,
compliance orders, and even promulgate industry guidelines, if necessary.
Commentators have long noted the lack of “teeth” vested in Canada’s Privacy
Commissioner and questioned the effectiveness of the ombudsman model.116 The
BC Civil Liberties Association, in its 2006 report, also calls for broadened powers
for the Privacy Commissioner in terms of order-making and regulatory powers.117
An interesting proposal contained within the BCCLA report also calls for the ability of the Privacy Commissioner to award damages to complainants, similar to the
power enjoyed by Human Rights Tribunals in Canada, and by Privacy Commissioners in other jurisdictions.118
Relating to guideline-issuing powers, other jurisdictions have vested their Privacy Commissioners with such abilities. In New Zealand, for instance, the Privacy
Commissioner works with industry to create best practice guidelines which, once
adopted by the Commissioner, have the force of law within the country.119 It is
noted that by encouraging industry towards responsible internal self-regulation, Privacy Commissioners can better dedicate scarce resources elsewhere.120 Vesting
Canada’s Privacy Commissioner with guideline-making powers may also allow for
quicker action in relation to emerging technologies. Should Industry Canada guidelines be delayed through red-tape, the Privacy Commissioner may fill the gap with
interim, but still binding, guidelines until the government can issue its definitive set
of mandates to industry.
Such a recommendation for expanding the Privacy Commissioner’s powers is
not without controversy. Empowering the Privacy Commissioner with binding
powers changes the essential role of the Commissioner. Rather than being an
ombudsman, the Commissioner then becomes an “ombudsman with a stick”, which
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in essence creates a more adversarial quasi-regulatory power similar to that of a
Human Rights Tribunal as discussed above.121 Such a change in framework has
been resisted by even Privacy Commissioners themselves. Speaking at a CENTRUM Conference in Toronto, then-Privacy Commissioner Bruce Phillips stated “I
have no powers of enforcement and . . . I want no powers of enforcement. Neither
I, nor my staff, want these powers.”122 Jennifer Stoddart shared this view as recently as 2005, criticizing the “adversarial, litigious and less flexible approach” of
regulatory models dealing with privacy violations.123 One further notes that in its
5-year review of PIPEDA, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics also rejected the idea of granting broader powers to the Privacy
Commissioner.124
The above objections aside, however, the ombudsman model’s time in the sun
has passed. While Canada’s Privacy Commissioner has scored notable, and surprising, victories against tech giants Facebook and Google, compliance among smallto-medium sized businesses is noticeably lacking.125 A recent CBC investigation,
for example, revealed poor compliance with notice requirements for businesses
making use of closed-circuit surveillance systems.126 This has particular relevance
to NFC technology, as business operators’ compliance in regard to informed consent is especially important in an NFC context given the invisible nature of the data
collection that occurs. Commentators note that perhaps the best way to get the attention of small- and medium-sized privacy violators, who currently have little, if
any, incentive to cooperate with the Privacy Commissioner is through the imposition of fines.127
Looking overseas, a number of jurisdictions employing an ombudsman model
in regard to privacy protection are transitioning to a regulatory framework that al-
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lows their Privacy Commissioners greater powers, including the ability to levy
fines.128 Increasingly, Canada stands alone in its embrace of the ombudsman model
in relation to privacy protection. Perhaps most telling, Jennifer Stoddart, reversing
her position from 2005, also now calls for greater powers for her office, including
fining authority, commenting that respondents “pay lip service to our concerns and
then ignore our advice.”129
Rapid advances in technology, not just in relation to NFC, bring with them
new and more complex privacy challenges. Canada’s Privacy Commissioner must
be able to address those privacy concerns through coercive means if necessary. The
case of NFC is a prime example; with the technology’s ability to rapidly build
profiles on individual users, it is imperative that the Privacy Commissioner be able
to compel compliance with PIPEDA to undercut potential leaks or misuse of personal information gleaned through NFC usage.

V. CONCLUSION
Near-field Communication technology brings with it both benefits and challenges. When utilized properly, NFC-enabled devices serve as an effective cash
replacement, allowing for rapid, convenient micro-payments in a number of commercial and commuting settings. It is, however, also a technology which carries its
own set of privacy-related challenges. NFC-enabled devices leave a long electronic
trail, allowing for building profiles of individual consumers with relative ease.
Moreover, large amounts of personally-identifying information are also gathered,
and stored on, the NFC-devices themselves, as well as the databases under which
NFC technology operates.
As noted above, some countries, such as Japan, took a pro-active approach to
NFC technology. Clear industry guidelines were promulgated by various ministries
of the Japanese government, and the Japanese Penal Code contains broad language
that captures NFC-technology in its various anti-fraud provisions. Canada, by comparison, lags in dealing with NFC technology. This can be partially excused given
that the technology is still in its infancy in Canada; however, it is a technology
poised for widespread adoption in the country. Given that, it is imperative that Canada position itself to proactively deal with the privacy challenges raised by NFC
technology. In that regard, clear, binding guidelines, either from Industry Canada or
Canada’s Privacy Commissioner, are necessary to make clear the applicability of
PIPEDA to the technology, and for setting out best-practices for securing users’
personally-identifying information. An amendment to Canada’s Criminal Code
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dealing with the maladministration of NFC devices and cards would also be of
benefit, and eliminate any uncertainty in the law.
Perhaps the biggest aid in the smooth adoption of NFC technology on a widespread basis, and to privacy protection in general, is expanding the powers currently enjoyed by Canada’s Privacy Commissioner. Such expanded powers are not
unheard of in the Commonwealth, as noted above, and even in Canada at a provincial level; Alberta and British Columbia utilize a “hybrid” model which allows limited sanctioning powers to its Privacy Commissioners.130 Moving away from an
ombudsman approach, the Privacy Commissioner can compel greater compliance
through stronger enforcement powers, particularly among small to medium-sized
businesses.
It is clear that Canada must adjust its approach to deal with the future widespread adoption of NFC technology in the country. This is not an insurmountable
task; Canada does have a privacy and regulatory framework in place and thus the
answer rests in tweaking that system, rather than in building it from the ground up.
In that regard, amending the Criminal Code, creating clear industry guidelines, and
redefining the role of the Privacy Commissioner are all means by which Canada
can pre-empt, and eventually benefit from, the widespread use of NFC technology.
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